Why Almost Everyone Misunderstands The Problem(s) of Demarcation
Oct 17, 2017 1:00 PM
The Return of a Demarcation Problem
Jun 23, 2017 3:00 PM
Conceptual Spaces as a Framework for Pedagogy in the Sciences
Aug 26, 2016 3:15 PM
Two Diachronic Grounds for Movement Within Conceptual Spaces
Jun 1, 2016 1:00 PM
Meeting the Scientific Anti-Realist's Epistemic Burdens
Apr 22, 2016 5:10 PM
Swamping the Swampers
Jun 13, 2015 1:00 PM
The Overpopulation of Solutions to Philosophical Problems
May 1, 2015 1:00 PM
Why Deflationist Theories of Knowledge Deserve Consideration
Feb 11, 2015 4:30 PM
The Value of True Belief
Dec 11, 2014 1:00 PM
Problems the History of Science Presents for Accepting Counter-Closure
Sep 6, 2014 5:10 PM

Reconstructing motivations for Carnap’s demarcation criteria


I present a brief overview of a problem related to the value problem in epistemology, then illustrate two ways of framing any ‘final value’ to normative demarcation criteria by examining ‘early’ and ‘later’ Karl Popper’s views on the subject. I end by presenting the mature objection raised by Paul Feyerabend that targets both views held by ‘early’ and ‘later’ Popper.


I present one patently poor–but popular–objection to ‘normative’ demarcation criteria that is often (mistakenly) attributed to Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn. I then show why this objection is misdirected against all proposed solutions to normative problems of demarcation. I then present the more nuanced objection that more accurately reflects the arguments set out by Lakatos, Feyerabend and (implicitly) Kuhn’s writings.


History surrounding the star-size problem reveals a case of transient underdetermination


The underlying motivations for accepting the objection from ill-fit as a case of ‘one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens’. That is to say, the structure of the argument is taken to show that if our intuitive concepts and explications and refinements of our intuitive concepts are in conflict, the intuition is to be preferred. Specifically, should any criteria of demarcation not be in accordance with our strongly-held intuitions, one of the two must go, intuition prevails at the expense of demarcation criteria.



I am a graduate teaching assistant for the following courses at King’s College London:

  • Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology module (2018)
  • 6AANA024: Philosophy of Psychology I (2017)
  • 6AANB049: Philosophy of Psychology II (2017)
  • Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology module (2015)
  • Epistemology I (2015)

I have previously taught the following courses as an adjunct professor at the Community College of Baltimore County:

  • Introduction to Philosophy (2014)
  • Critical Thinking (2014)