Posts

Reconstructing motivations for Carnap’s demarcation criteria

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I present a brief overview of a problem related to the value problem in epistemology, then illustrate two ways of framing any ‘final value’ to normative demarcation criteria by examining ‘early’ and ‘later’ Karl Popper’s views on the subject. I end by presenting the mature objection raised by Paul Feyerabend that targets both views held by ‘early’ and ‘later’ Popper.

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I present one patently poor–but popular–objection to ‘normative’ demarcation criteria that is often (mistakenly) attributed to Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn. I then show why this objection is misdirected against all proposed solutions to normative problems of demarcation. I then present the more nuanced objection that more accurately reflects the arguments set out by Lakatos, Feyerabend and (implicitly) Kuhn’s writings.

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History surrounding the star-size problem reveals a case of transient underdetermination

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The underlying motivations for accepting the objection from ill-fit as a case of ‘one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens’. That is to say, the structure of the argument is taken to show that if our intuitive concepts and explications and refinements of our intuitive concepts are in conflict, the intuition is to be preferred. Specifically, should any criteria of demarcation not be in accordance with our strongly-held intuitions, one of the two must go, intuition prevails at the expense of demarcation criteria.

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I address a number of issues with the ‘science populariser’ Lawrence Krauss, specifically his ignorance surrounding history of science and history of philosophy of science. I cover one obvious case that Krauss should know about if he knew anything about a subject he continues to insult.

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Edward Feser presents an objection to Hume’s Fork: it is, so Feser claims, self-refuting. I respond by showing the objection does not hold water.

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In a recent article in Philosophy Now, ‘How I Solved Hume’s Problem and Why Nobody Will Believe Me’, Dr Eugene Earnshaw of Seneca College claims, as evidenced by the title of his article, to have solved Hume’s problem of induction. If true, this would be no small feat. However, Earnshaw has not solved Hume’s problem of induction. In fact, Earnshaw fails to address the already extant literature responding to the purported solution.

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