Reconstructing motivations for Carnap’s demarcation criteria
I am a philosophy postgrad at King’s College London. My research interests include philosophy of science, history of science and epistemology. My present work is on rehabilitating early demarcation criteria first proposed by Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper. I currently work as an editor for the APA blog and as a researcher at the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History; I volunteer as an assistant editor at the HPS&ST Note. I am the current President of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association (2019/20). A copy of my CV is available here.
MPhil in Philosophy, 2018
King's College London
MA in Philosophy, 2013
University College London
BA in Philosophy, 2011
Oberlin College
Reconstructing motivations for Carnap’s demarcation criteria
I present a brief overview of a problem related to the value problem in epistemology, then illustrate two ways of framing any ‘final value’ to normative demarcation criteria by examining ‘early’ and ‘later’ Karl Popper’s views on the subject. I end by presenting the mature objection raised by Paul Feyerabend that targets both views held by ‘early’ and ‘later’ Popper.
I present one patently poor–but popular–objection to ‘normative’ demarcation criteria that is often (mistakenly) attributed to Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn. I then show why this objection is misdirected against all proposed solutions to normative problems of demarcation. I then present the more nuanced objection that more accurately reflects the arguments set out by Lakatos, Feyerabend and (implicitly) Kuhn’s writings.
History surrounding the star-size problem reveals a case of transient underdetermination
The underlying motivations for accepting the objection from ill-fit as a case of ‘one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens’. That is to say, the structure of the argument is taken to show that if our intuitive concepts and explications and refinements of our intuitive concepts are in conflict, the intuition is to be preferred. Specifically, should any criteria of demarcation not be in accordance with our strongly-held intuitions, one of the two must go, intuition prevails at the expense of demarcation criteria.
I am a graduate teaching assistant for the following courses at King’s College London:
I have previously taught the following courses as an adjunct professor at the Community College of Baltimore County: